The Legislature Versus the Judiciary: Defining Injury under the Tort Immunity Act by Ailor, Stephanie M.
DePaul Law Review 
Volume 57 
Issue 4 Summer 2008 Article 7 
The Legislature Versus the Judiciary: Defining Injury under the 
Tort Immunity Act 
Stephanie M. Ailor 
Follow this and additional works at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/law-review 
Recommended Citation 
Stephanie M. Ailor, The Legislature Versus the Judiciary: Defining Injury under the Tort Immunity Act, 57 
DePaul L. Rev. 1021 (2008) 
Available at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/law-review/vol57/iss4/7 
This Notes is brought to you for free and open access by the College of Law at Via Sapientiae. It has been accepted 
for inclusion in DePaul Law Review by an authorized editor of Via Sapientiae. For more information, please contact 
digitalservices@depaul.edu. 
THE LEGISLATURE VERSUS THE JUDICIARY:
DEFINING "INJURY" UNDER THE
TORT IMMUNITY ACT
INTRODUCTION
Illinois law currently leaves local governmental entities and their
employees wondering whether and to what degree they enjoy immu-
nity from lawsuits relating to their official duties. The governing stat-
ute seems clear on its face: the plain language of the Illinois Local
Governmental and Governmental Employee Tort Immunity Act'
("Tort Immunity Act" or "Act") grants local governmental entities
and their employees immunity from both tort suits and certain other
civil actions, including suits arising under the Illinois constitution. In
fact, the Act's text unambiguously provides that its coverage extends
to "any injury alleged in a civil action, whether based upon the Consti-
tution of the United States or the Constitution of the State of Illinois,
and the statutes or common law of Illinois or of the United States."'2
However, statutory interpretation has rendered the Act's seemingly
clear text ambiguous. In several recent decisions, Illinois courts have
recognized only immunity from tort suits. The conflict between the
plain language of the Act as written by the legislature and its interpre-
tation by the judiciary arises from conflicting definitions of an "in-
jury." On one hand, the plain language of the Act explicitly mandates
that local governmental entities and their employees are immune from
actions under the Constitution of the State of Illinois.3 But, on the
other hand, some Illinois courts have refused to recognize the full ex-
tent of this coverage, instead limiting the immunity afforded by the
Act to protection against tort lawsuits alone.4
This conflict is improper, and courts should resolve it by acknowl-
edging the full definition of immunity provided in the statute's plain
language. Courts should do so for several reasons. First, this inconsis-
1. The entire statute is codified at 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. 10/1-101 to 10/1-210 (2006). The Act
was first enacted in 1965; section 1-204, which defines an injury for purposes of the Act, was
amended in 1986.
2. 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. 10/1-204.
3. Id.
4. See, e.g., People ex rel. Birkett v. City of Chicago, 758 N.E.2d 25, 30 (I1. App. Ct. 2001)
(stating that the Tort Immunity Act does not apply to claims brought under the Illinois state
constitution).
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tency weakens legal authority. 5 Second, the functioning of the Illinois
legal system is impaired by the conflict between two branches of its
government. 6 Third, it is more proper for the legislature to define this
area of the law than for the judiciary to do so. 7 Fourth, because the
courts are meant to act as a check on the legislature, it is improper for
courts to overlook the express intent of the legislature without either
overturning the statute or excising part of it for some justifiable
purpose.8
This Note argues that the Illinois Supreme Court should eliminate
the contradiction between the Act's text and its interpretation by hon-
oring the legislature's intent. Part II discusses the historical context of
sovereign and local governmental immunity and traces the develop-
ment of each in Illinois. 9 Part III examines several Illinois court deci-
sions limiting municipal immunity to protection solely against torts,
consequently excluding actions under the Illinois constitution from
coverage under the Act.' 0 Part III also critiques the courts' reasoning
in those cases." Part IV assesses the impact of the existing discrep-
ancy and presents the benefits of resolving the contradiction by honor-
ing the statute's plain language. 12 While recognizing the full definition
intended by the legislature is the most straightforward and appropri-
ate solution available to the courts, Part IV also considers other
means by which the inconsistency could be eliminated. 13 Many other
states have enacted immunity statutes similar to Illinois's Act without
creating similar inconsistency in their laws; Part IV references some of
the means chosen by those states as options to which the Illinois legis-
lature or judiciary might look for guidance in resolving this conflict. 14
However, the Illinois Supreme Court should resolve this irregularity
by following the established rules of statutory construction and honor-
ing the legislature's intent, both of which would be accomplished by
5. See infra notes 141-161 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 179-194 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 220-232 and accompanying text.
8. See United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 442 (1965) (stating that the framers of the Consti-
tution intended the Bill of Attainder Clause to implement the separation of powers among
branches of government, thus acting as "a general safeguard against legislative exercise of the
judicial function"); see also ILL. CONST. art. II, § 1 (1970) (separation of powers clause); Harinek
v. 161 N. Clark St. Ltd. P'ship, 692 N.E.2d 1177 (Il. 1998).
9. See infra notes 24-134 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 135-204 and accompanying text.
11. Id.
12. See infra notes 205-233 and accompanying text.
13. Id.
14. Id.
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recognizing the full meaning of injury clearly intended by the Act's
authors.
II. BACKGROUND
To understand the current state of local governmental immunity in
Illinois, it is helpful to study the doctrine's origins. This Part examines
the common law doctrine of sovereign immunity, 15 how it became the
law in Illinois, 16 and why Illinois ultimately replaced it with statutory
immunity. 17 First, it traces the development of local governmental im-
munity, starting with Illinois courts' initial adoption of common law
sovereign immunity and its extension to municipalities, followed by
courts' later decisions to overturn it, thus subjecting local governmen-
tal bodies and their employees to liability for acts undertaken while
carrying out official duties. 18 It then discusses the incorporation of
this change into the Illinois constitution.19 Subsequently, this Part
analyzes the legislature's response: the passage of the Tort Immunity
Act, which created statutory immunity from certain lawsuits brought
against local governmental bodies and their employees and the
amendment of the Act to include actions under the Illinois constitu-
tion.20 This Part next provides an overview of the Act's terms 2' and
cases properly applying those terms.22 Finally, it examines a number
of early cases that interpreted the Act's scope using the original defi-
nition of injury and compares them with cases decided after the legis-
lature amended injury to include actions under the Illinois
constitution. 23
A. Sovereign Immunity
The roots of the governmental immunity provisions found in the
Tort Immunity Act date back to precolonial England.24 Specifically,
the Illinois Supreme Court has traced the concept to the English doc-
trine of sovereign immunity, which protected the king from lawsuits, 25
as well as to an early English decision extending the doctrine to limit a
15. See infra notes 24-32 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 33-50 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 51-63 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 24-58 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 59-61 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 62-64 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 65-77 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 78-106 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 107-134 and accompanying text.
24. Molitor v. Kaneland Cmty. Unit Dist. No. 302, 163 N.E.2d 89, 93 (I1. 1959).
25. Id. at 91.
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municipality's liability. 26 England created sovereign immunity to pro-
tect its king and to acknowledge his supremacy. 27 The doctrine, liter-
ally signifying that "the King can do no wrong, '28 recognized that the
king was exempt from suits against him to which he did not consent. 29
Considering the founders' hostility toward the idea of an untouchable
ruler and their desire to place the government within the reach of its
citizens, one wonders why they adopted such a provision. 30 Despite
these tenets, the founders were sufficiently concerned that the federal
government would interfere with the sovereignty of individual states
at the time of the U.S. Constitution's ratification to revive the doc-
trine, which was seen as protecting against the federal threat.31 The
Eleventh Amendment ultimately was passed to address these
concerns.
32
Sovereign immunity became the law in Illinois at the state's incep-
tion, when Illinois adopted English common law and incorporated it
into the state constitution.33 Under this doctrine, governmental enti-
ties and their officers were immune from suit for many acts under-
taken pursuant to their official duties. The doctrine rested in part on
policy concerns regarding the monetary burden such suits would place
on taxpayers. 34 For example, in Craig v. City of Charleston, the Illi-
26. Id. (citing Russell v. Men of Devon, (1788) 100 Eng. Rep. 359).
27. Muskopf v. Corning Hosp. Dist., 359 P.2d 457, 458 n.1 (Cal. 1961); see also Erwin Chemer-
insky, Against Sovereign Immunity, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1201, 1202 (2001) (reviewing the history of
sovereign immunity, pointing out its conflict with basic American democratic principles, criticiz-
ing its recent expansion, and arguing in favor of abolishing sovereign immunity).
28. Muskopf, 359 P.2d at 458 n.1.
29. Angela S. Fetcher, Outdated, Confusing, and Unfair: A Glimpse at Sovereign Immunity in
Kentucky, 41 BRANDEIS L.J. 959, 960 (2003). Cf Mark C. Niles, "Nothing but Mischief': The
Federal Tort Claims Act and the Scope of Discretionary Immunity, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 1275, 1283
(2002) (citing Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 102-03 (1996) (Souter, J., dissenting)
(stating that sovereign immunity limited the law's power both substantively, because the King
was effectively above the law, and jurisdictionally, because the King was the source of justice and
therefore not to be judged by himself)).
30. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776). The signers complained of the
king's "long train of abuses and usurpations," including his "refus[al] to assent to [his own] laws"
and his refusal to afford representation to all citizens, resulting of course in absolving "all alle-
giance to the British Crown." Id. at para. 2, 32. Much of the criticism of state and local immu-
nity provisions stems from the sentiment that immunity is hostile to the American system. See
also Chemerinsky, supra note 27, at 1201-02.
31. Fetcher, supra note 29, at 960-61.
32. Id.
33. Molitor v. Kaneland Cmty. Unit Dist. No. 302, 163 N.E.2d 89, 98 (Il1. 1959) (Davis, J.,
dissenting).
34. Arteman v. Clinton Cmty. Unit Sch. Dist. No. 15, 763 N.E.2d 756, 760 (I11. 2002) ("By
providing immunity [to local governmental entities via the Tort Immunity Act], the General
Assembly sought to prevent the dissipation of public funds on damage awards.").
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nois Supreme Court absolved the city and its mayor from liability for
the actions of one of its police officers:
The same principle which absolves the city from liability for [the
officer's] tortious act applies to the act of the mayor. The mayor
was simply exercising a discretion vested in him by virtue of his of-
fice and the laws of the state. If the [mayor's] appointment [of the
officer] was a wrongful act, which resulted in injury to the appellant,
the burdens of liability cannot be cast upon the inhabitants and tax-
payers of the city. A municipal corporation, while simply exercising
its police powers, is not liable for the acts of its officers in the viola-
tion of the laws of the state and in excess of the legal powers of the
city. 35
The Illinois Supreme Court recognized a similar exception to the
usual rule of respondeat superior in Wilcox v. City of Chicago.36 Wil-
cox dealt with fire protection, another municipal power.37 In its rea-
soning, the court cited "a uniform line of decisions holding that cities
are not liable for the negligent acts of officers or men employed in
their fire departments whilst in the discharge of their duty. '38 The
court upheld this principle:
To permit recoveries to be had for all such and other acts would
virtually render the city an insurer of every person's property within
the limits of its jurisdiction .... To allow recoveries for the negli-
gence of the fire department would almost certainly subject prop-
erty holders to as great, if not greater, burdens than are suffered
from the damages from fire. Sound public policy would forbid it, if
it was not prohibited by authority.39
Thus, sovereign immunity was an established doctrine in Illinois, hav-
ing been implemented to protect society at large and property holders
in particular.
Although such immunity was well supported in state decisional law,
it was not without criticism. 40 Some of this criticism goes to the doc-
35. 54 N.E. 184, 184-85 (Ill. 1899). Immunity also barred municipal liability for police con-
duct in President and Board of Trustees of the Town of Odell v. Schroeder, 58 111. 353, 356 (1871).
36. 107 Ill. 334 (1883).
37. Id. at 336.
38. Id. at 338.
39. Id. at 339-40.
40. This criticism continues today and is reflected in substantial legal scholarship. Interesting
recent developments include discussions of whether sovereign immunity might be available as a
defense against government misconduct in the War on Terror, including offenses in Guantanamo
Bay, Iraq, and Afghanistan. See, e.g., Susan Burke, Accountability for Corporate Complicity in
Torture, 10 GONZ. J. INT'L LAW 81 (2006); Kateryna L. Rakowsky, Military Contractors and Civil
Liability: Use of the Government Contractor Defense to Escape Allegations of Misconduct in Iraq
and Afghanistan, 2 STAN. J. Civ. RTS. & Civ. LIBERTIES 365 (2006); Kelly Mahon Tullier, Gov-
ernmental Liability for Negligent Failure to Detain Drunk Drivers, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 873, 887
(1992) (criticizing the use of immunity to shield government actors where the result is "a duty to
none" where there ought to be a duty to all).
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trine's core, including the fact that sovereign immunity principles were
never extended to units other than those at the state level. 41 Because
municipalities and other entities-protected then by common law im-
munity and today by the Tort Immunity Act-technically are not dis-
tinct "sovereigns," it is important to distinguish between state
sovereign immunity and local governmental immunity.42 Some au-
thority justifies extending sovereign immunity to municipalities under
the theory that municipalities act as the sovereign's representatives or
agents.43  The Illinois Supreme Court found the justification for ex-
tending sovereign immunity to municipalities in the 1788 English deci-
sion Russell v. Men of Devon.44 In Russell, suit against a municipality
was disallowed on two main grounds. 45 First, there were no funds out
of which to pay a judgment against the municipality.46 Second, the
court justified suppressing plaintiff's ability to sue, because doing so
protected the public good, which it deemed superior to that of an indi-
vidual plaintiff's ability to redress her grievance. 47
Similar logic persists today in many states-including Illinois-that
have limited or eliminated the liability of local government units and
their employees for certain acts undertaken within their official capac-
ities.48 In Illinois, courts have taken notice that, by passing the Act,
41. See supra note 40.
42. 18 EUGENE MCQUILLIN, MCQUILLIN MUN. CORP. § 53.02.10 (3d ed. 2003); Michael P.
Taylor, Pohutski v. Allen Park: The Michigan Supreme Court Concludes that the Michigan Gov-
ernment Tort Liability Act Does Not Allow for the Common Law "Trespass-Nuisance" Exception
to Governmental Immunity, as Applicable to Municipalities, 81 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 91, 101
(2003) (distinguishing between sovereign and governmental immunity); see also Caruso v. City
of Milford, 815 A.2d 167, 170 (Conn. App. Ct. 2003) (finding that, although municipalities do not
have sovereign immunity, governmental immunity serves to protect them from liability for negli-
gence in the performance of government functions).
43. W.E. Shipley, Annotation, Municipal Immunity from Liability for Torts, 60 A.L.R.2d 1198,
§ 2 (1958). For example, Maryland courts have used this rationale. See, e.g., Whalen v. Mayor &
City Council of Bait., 883 A.2d 228, 248-49 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2005).
44. Molitor v. Kaneland Cmty. Unit Dist. No. 302, 163 N.E.2d 89, 91 (111. 1959) (citing Russell
v. Men of Devon, (1788) 100 Eng. Rep. 359).
45. Russell, 100 Eng. Rep. at 359.
46. Id. at 362.
47. Id.; see also Hargrove v. Town of Cocoa Beach, 96 So. 2d 130 (Fla. 1957) (en banc). In
Hargrove, the Florida Supreme Court abolished sovereign immunity, making it the first state to
do so. 96 So. 2d at 133. Florida's Supreme Court rested its decision on the following bases: (1)
the courts had created the doctrine of sovereign immunity and therefore had the authority to
abolish it; (2) abolishing the entire doctrine at once was easier and more efficient than chipping
away at it slowly by creating limitations; and (3) modern cities acted more like businesses than
sovereigns; thus, continuing to vest in them "sovereign divinity" would be to "predicate the law
of the Twentieth Century upon an Eighteenth Century anachronism." Id. at 132-33.
48. Compare Merrill v. City of Manchester, 332 A.2d 378, 383 (N.H. 1974) (justifying immu-
nity on the grounds that municipalities exist only for the public good, because of equity concerns,
and the fact that municipalities have a dual nature as both governmental and private entities),
with Sigmund D. Schutz, Time to Reconsider Nullum Tempus Occurrit Regi-The Applicability
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the legislature "sought to prevent the dissipation of public funds on
damage awards in tort cases."'49 In addition to the efficiency of incon-
veniencing scattered individuals rather than the public as a whole, an-
other justification is the theory that public officials will carry out their
duties more effectively if they need not fear tort liability for their
acts.50
B. The Illinois Supreme Court's Abolition of Sovereign Immunity
In 1959, the Illinois Supreme Court abolished sovereign immunity
in Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit District No. 302. 51 In Molitor,
the plaintiff brought suit against a school district on behalf of a stu-
dent who suffered injuries when the school bus in which the child was
riding "left the road . . . hit a culvert, exploded and burned. '52 The
Molitor court abolished sovereign immunity, despite its deep historical
of Statutes of Limitation Against the State of Maine in Civil Actions, 55 ME. L. REV. 373, 381
(2003) (finding that sovereign immunity in Maine was overruled when the courts determined it
to be an incongruous remnant of English jurisprudence); see also Grimm v. Ariz. Bd. of Pardons
& Paroles, 564 P.2d 1227, 1232 (Ariz. 1977) (extending immunity based on discretionary acts to
governmental employees).
49. Kevin's Towing, Inc. v. Thomas, 814 N.E. 1003, 1007 (I11. App. Ct. 2004) (quoting Van
Meter v. Darien Park Dist., 799 N.E. 2d 273 (I11. 2003)).
50. This rationale underlies the statutory distinction between discretionary functions, for
which municipalities and public officials are generally immune, and other acts, including proprie-
tary acts, for which they may not be immune. Also, many statutes waive immunity for willful
and wanton conduct. The Illinois statute codifies immunity for the exercise of governmental
discretionary acts as 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. 10/2-201 (2006) and the willful and wanton exception
to immunity in several specific contexts, including section 10/3-108, relating to the supervision
and use of municipal property, and section 10/5-101, relating to rescue workers' response to
emergency calls. See also Matthews v. Martin, 658 S.W.2d 374, 375 (Ark. 1983) (finding that city
officials were immune from tort liability for negligent acts undertaken in performance of official
duties; although the courts abolished sovereign immunity, it now exists in Arkansas pursuant to
a statute passed reinstating some municipal liability as a matter of public policy); Clayton v.
Branson, 570 S.E.2d 253, 256-57 (N.C. Ct. App. 2002) (noting the importance of the fact that
government officers and employees share the immunity afforded municipalities while perform-
ing governmental functions); City of Houston v. Vargas, 193 S.W.3d 143, 146 (Tex. App. 2006)
(stating that sovereign immunity, unless waived, protects a municipality exercising governmental
functions).
51. 163 N.E.2d 89 (I11. 1959). The court framed that issue with the question, "should a school
district be immune from liability for a tortiously inflicted personal injury to a pupil thereof aris-
ing out of the operation of a school bus owned and operated by said district?" Id. at 90. The
case came to stand for the proposition that local governmental entities were no longer immune
from suit. See, e.g., Vill. of Bloomingdale v. C.D.G. Enters., Inc., 752 N.E. 2d 1090, 1095 (I11.
2001) ("Traditionally, a governmental unit in Illinois was immune from tort liability pursuant to
the common law doctrine of sovereign immunity. In 1959, however, this court abolished the
doctrine in Molitor." (citation omitted)).
52. 163 N.E.2d at 89.
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roots, and held the district liable for damages resulting from the
child's injuries.53
The Illinois Supreme Court considered a number of factors when
reaching its decision to overturn sovereign immunity and allow the
suit against the district to proceed. First, it discussed the history of
sovereign immunity and its extension to local government in Russell v.
Devon; Illinois adopted Russell's immunity doctrine "with reference
to towns and counties" in the 1870 case Town of Waltham v. Kemper.5 4
Significantly, the court noted that the Russell decision was later over-
ruled in England and that non-immunity continues there today.
55
Next, the court observed that a number of statutes then in existence
authorized municipal liability in certain contexts. 56 The court also
concluded that governmental immunity caused injustice; it cited Har-
grove v. City of Cocoa Beach, the 1957 case in which Florida became
the first state to abolish sovereign immunity.57 Ultimately, the court
held the school district liable and declared that "all prior decisions to
the contrary are hereby overruled." 58
The Illinois Supreme Court had the authority to abolish sovereign
immunity in Molitor, because it was a common law doctrine. The
court did indicate, however, that the legislature could adopt statutory
53. Id. at 98. At the outset of its opinion, the Molitor court observed that, "while adhering to
the old immunity rule, this court has not reconsidered and re-evaluated the doctrine of immunity
of school districts for over fifty years." Id. at 90. Later, the court concluded that "none of the
reasons advanced in support of school district immunity have any true validity today." Id. at 95.
The court justified its departure from stare decisis, "because we believe justice and policy require
such a departure." Id. at 96.
54. Id. at 91 (citing Town of Waltham v. Kemper, 55 Il. 346 (1870)).
55. Id. (citing Crisp v. Thomas, 63 L.T.N.S. 756 (1890)).
56. Id. (specifically referring to the Workmen's Compensation and Occupational Disease
Acts). Section 10/2-101 of the Act explicitly excludes various statutes from its coverage, includ-
ing the Metropolitan Transit Authority Act, the Workers' Compensation Act, the Workers' Oc-
cupational Diseases Act, the Illinois Municipal Code, and the Illinois Uniform Conviction
Information Act. 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. 10/2-101(b)-(f) (2006).
57. Molitor, 163 N.E.2d at 94 (citing Hargrove v. Town of Cocoa Beach, 96 So. 2d 130 (Fla.
1957) (en banc)) ("[W]e agree with the Supreme Court of Florida that in preserving the sover-
eign immunity theory, courts have overlooked the fact that the Revolutionary War was fought to
abolish that 'divine right of kings' on which the theory is based."). Cf Kelley H. Armitage, It's
Good to be King (at Least it Used to Be and Could Be Again): A Textualist View of Sovereign
Immunity, 29 STETSON L. REV. 599, 603 (2000) (discussing notions of injustice behind the aboli-
tion of sovereign and local governmental immunity provisions); John Martinez, Hurry Up and
Wait: Negative Statutes of Limitation in the Government Tort Liability Setting, 19 ST. JOHN'S J.
LEGAL COMMENT. 259, 273 (2005) (discussing the Florida Supreme Court's decision to "remove
the shield of sovereign immunity" from state and local governments because, as stated in Har-
grove, "[judicial consistency loses its virtue when it is downgraded by the vice of injustice");
Shipley, supra note 43 (discussing other reasons for the Florida Supreme Court's rejection of the
sovereign immunity doctrine in toto).
58. Molitor, 163 N.E.2d at 98.
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sovereign immunity if it chose. The 1970 Illinois constitution abol-
ished common law sovereign immunity. 59 Article XIII, Section 4 of
the Illinois constitution is the ultimate state authority on the issue; it
abolishes sovereign immunity in Illinois, except as the legislature pro-
vides by statute.60 Thus, current governmental immunity in Illinois is
entirely statutory and no longer exists as a remnant of the common
law tradition. 6'
C. The Creation of the Tort Immunity Act by the Illinois
Legislature and the Act's Language
Today, the Tort Immunity Act governs local governmental entities'
immunity from liability for damages.62 The Illinois Supreme Court
recognizes that "tort liability of a local public entity or employee is
expressly controlled both by the constitutional provision and by legis-
lative prerogative as embodied in the Tort Immunity Act. '63 The leg-
islature passed the Act in response to Molitor, and the courts
ultimately upheld it.64
59. ILL. CoNsT. art. XIII, § 4 (1970) ("Except as the General Assembly may provide by law,
sovereign immunity in this state is abolished.").
60. Id. (cited in In re Chi. Flood Litig., 680 N.E.2d 265, 271 (IlI. 1997)).
61. Accordingly, it is improper to look to the common law to determine the scope of a local
government entity's duty. Vill. of Bloomingdale v. C.D.G. Enters., Inc., 752 N.E.2d 1090, 1096
(Ill. 2001) (stating that, when a court finds that the General Assembly has granted a public entity
immunity, the court may not negate it by applying common law exceptions to common law
rules). California's doctrines are similar. Cf. Austen L. Parrish, Avoiding the Mistakes of Terrell
R.: The Undoing of the California Tort Claims Act and the Move to Absolute Governmental
Immunity in Foster Care Placement and Supervision, 15 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 267, 281 (2004)
(discussing California's entirely statutory governmental tort immunity policies). As in Illinois,
California courts effectively abolished sovereign immunity, and the legislature subsequently re-
established it by statute. See id.
62. See Vill. of Bloomingdale, 752 N.E.2d at 1095-96 (stating that Illinois courts must look to
the Tort Immunity Act, not common law, to determine the presence or absence of local govern-
mental immunity).
63. Id. at 1095 (citing Burdinie v. Vill. of Glendale Heights, 565 N.E.2d 654, 657-58 (Ill.
1990)).
64. See Dewitt v. McHenry County, 691 N.E.2d 388, 392 (11. App. Ct. 1998). In fact, there
was a considerable amount of interaction between the legislature and the courts during the pe-
riod immediately following Molitor's announcement. The legislature, attempting to quickly cod-
ify the immunities that had just been abolished, enacted several statutes that the courts
overturned. First, almost immediately after Molitor was decided, the Illinois legislature
"pass[edl a series of acts granting absolute immunity to a number of specific types of municipal
entities." Id. These statutes were overturned by the state supreme court, primarily because they
applied only to some entities while other entities performed essentially the same functions, and
the legislature gave no reason for distinguishing among them. Id. When overturning the stat-
utes, the Illinois Supreme Court contemporaneously suggested that an act specifying immune
municipal functions-rather than distinguishing a few immune entities among many that per-
formed similar functions-might be upheld. Harvey v. Clyde Park Dist., 203 N.E.2d 573, 577
(I1. 1964). As a result, the Illinois Local Governmental and Governmental Employee Tort Im-
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The Tort Immunity Act immunizes local governmental entities and
their employees from a wide range of liability for injury to others. Its
sections apply broadly to various governmental employees; specific
sections address court volunteers, 65 police and correctional officers,
66
fire and rescue workers, 67 and medical personnel. 68 The Act generally
bars liability for discretionary acts and policy determinations, 69 while
in some circumstances preserving liability for willful and wanton con-
duct.70 The Act also governs immunity relating to the use of public
property. 71
Prior to its more detailed substantive sections, the Act sets out gen-
eral definitions and provisions applicable to the entire Act. 72 It pro-
tects local governmental entities from some suits arising from injuries,
as defined by section 10/1-204 of the Act. 73 The Act's original defini-
tion of an injury did not include actions under the Illinois constitution,
but the plain language of the statute today states that the Act covers
actions under the Illinois constitution. 74 Article I, Section 2 of Public
Act 84-1431, effective Nov. 25, 1986, specifically amended the statu-
tory definition of injury to include those injuries alleged in a civil ac-
tion based on the Illinois constitution:75
"Injury" means death, injury to a person, or damage to or loss of
property. It includes any other injury that a person may suffer to his
person, reputation, character or estate which does not result from
circumstances in which a privilege is otherwise conferred by law and
which is of such a nature that it would be actionable if inflicted by a
private person. "Injury" includes any injury alleged in a civil action,
munity Act, 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. 10/1-101 to 10/1-210 (2006), was ultimately passed and upheld
by the courts. Dewitt, 691 N.E.2d at 392. As this Note discusses below, the extensive contact
between the courts and the legislature related to this particular statute strengthens the need for
the courts to observe legislative intent and clearly communicate any deficiencies in the statute to
the legislature should they refuse to enforce the letter of the statute.
65. 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. 10/2-214.
66. 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. 10/4-101.
67. 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. 10/5-101.
68. 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. 10/6-101.
69. 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. 10/2-201.
70. See, e.g., 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. 10/3-108 (exception allowing liability for the willful and
wanton supervision or use of publicly owned property): 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. 10/5-106 (provid-
ing a willful and wanton conduct exception for response to emergency calls by fire and rescue
workers).
71. 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. 10/3-101 to 10/3-110 (governing the condition in which the owning
municipality maintains the property. as well as the property's use by the owner and activities by
non-owners on the land that are supervised by the owner).
72. 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. 10/1-201 to 10/1-210.
73. 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. 10/1-204. This same definition is repeated later in the Act; it was
amended at the same time that section 10/1-204 was amended. 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. 10/8-101(C).
74. Compare 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. 10/1-204 (2006), with IL. ST. CH. 85 § 1-204 (1965).
75. 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. 10/1-204 (2006).
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whether based upon the Constitution of the United States or the
Constitution of the State of Illinois, and the statutes or common law
of Illinois or of the United States.76
The original text did not include the words "or the Constitution of the
State of Illinois"; otherwise, it was identical. 77
D. Cases that Honor Legislative Intent When Interpreting the Act
The Tort Immunity Act provides limited, not blanket, immunity to
local governmental entities and their employees. When creating the
Act, the legislature intended to protect governmental entities with im-
munity, but only in certain contexts. 78 Limitations on the Act's scope
that are supported by the plain language of the statute and by histori-
cal principles are proper, because they honor legislative intent.79
To begin with, courts have properly held that local governmental
liability for contract claims lies outside the Act's protections. Unlike
constitutional claims, contract claims are not specifically included in
the Act's definition of injury.80 In fact, the plain language of section
10/2-101 denies local governmental entities and employees immunity
from them; it states, "Nothing in this Act affects the liability, if any, of
a local public entity or public employee based on ... Contract .... -81
In Dewitt v. McHenry County, the court considered whether the Act
immunized local governmental entities from liability for claims arising
from contract law.82 In Dewitt, the plaintiff sought municipal liability
76. Id. (emphasis added).
77. IL. ST. CH. 85 § 1-204 (1965).
78. 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. 10/1-101.1(a) (2006) ("The purpose of this Act is to protect local
public entities and public employees from liability arising from the operation of government. It
grants only immunities and defenses."). See Van Meter v. Darien Park Dist., 799 N.E.2d 273, 279
(I11. 2003) (stating that the Tort Immunity Act does not create any new duties; it merely codifies
certain duties that the legislature wished to preserve).
79. This includes, for example, the exclusion of contract claims, which is supported by both
the text of the Tort Immunity Act, section 10/2-101(a), and historical sovereign immunity princi-
ples. See, e.g., Dewitt v. McHenry County, 691 N.E.2d 388 (I11. App. Ct. 1998). Contract claims
and actions other than those for damages are excluded from immunity coverage at 745 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 10/2-101. Because both exclusions are written into the Act's text, they are distin-
guishable from the exclusion of immunity from claims under the Illinois state constitution, which
is not supported by the Act's text. "The surest and most reliable indictor of legislative intent is
the language of the statute." People v. Bole, 613 N.E.2d 740, 745 (Ill. 1993).
80. 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. 10/2-104 (making no mention of contract claims).
81. 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. 10/2-101.
82. 691 N.E.2d 388, 391 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998); see also Chi. Limousine Serv., Inc. v. City of
Chicago, 781 N.E.2d 421, 425 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002). In Chicago Limousine Service, the Illinois
Court of Appeals cited to Dewitt for the proposition that the Tort Immunity Act can be limited,
but this citation is improper for failure to distinguish between the textual references to contract
claims and claims under the Illinois constitution. 781 N.E.2d at 425. Also, when considering
liability under the Act, Dewitt cited to the definition of injury in section 10/1-204, quoting only a
partial definition-"death, injury to a person, or damage to or loss of property." Dewitt, 691
1031
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for breach of his government employment contract.8 3 The trial court
had dismissed his claim, finding instead that it was barred by the Act's
statute of limitations.84 On appeal, the Dewitt court conducted a
multi-step analysis to reach its ultimate conclusion. It looked first to
the text of the Act, next to the history behind the Act's creation and
passage, and finally to case law. The court first considered section 10/
2-101 of the Act, which provides that the Act does not affect munici-
pal liability based in contract. 85 The court determined that the text
did not fully resolve the matter, because section 10/2-101 created a
statute of limitations that merely shortens the amount of time in which
a claim for liability may be raised rather than entirely precluding lia-
bility.86 The court then noted that the Act's passage was a legislative
response to Molitor, a tort case involving injury.87 The court found
"nothing in the history or structure of the Act to indicate that the
legislature was concerned with allowing a governmental entity to limit
its liability for breaching a contract." 88 Finally, the court noted other
cases that had denied substantive liability for contract claims under
the Act, including DiMarco v. City of Chicago, in which the court
stated that "the legislature meant to exclude causes of action under
contract theory" when it passed the Act.8 9 Ultimately, the Dewitt
court concluded that the Act did not immunize local governmental
entities and employees from contract liability. 90 The thorough, well-
developed analysis employed in Dewitt provides a definite rule that
honors legislative intent and that other courts can follow.
N.E.2d at 391. While this quotation is sufficient for the facts in Dewitt, it is improper for cases
such as Chicago Limousine Service that do involve constitutional liability; those cases should
consider the full statutory definition of injury. Further, because of the factual distinctions be-
tween the cases, taking Dewitt's definition out of the context of its facts renders it incomplete
and misleading.
83. Dewitt, 691 N.E.2d at 389.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 391.
86. Id. at 391-92.
87. Id. at 392.
88. Id.
89. Dewitt, 691 N.E.2d at 392 (quoting DiMarco v. City of Chicago, 662 N.E.2d 525, 529-30
(Ill. App. Ct. 1996)).
90. Id. at 393. Additionally, many state courts applying common law principles have found
that sovereign immunity does not immunize local government entities from contract liability. 56
AM. JUR. 2D Mun. Corps. § 447 (2000) (citing Montgomery County v. Revere Nat'l Corp., 671
A.2d 1 (Md. 1996); Koenig v. City of South Haven, 597 N.W.2d 99 (Mich. 1999): Garcia v. Mid-
dle Rio Grande Conservancy Dist., 918 P.2d 7 (N.M. 1996): Houpe v. City of Statesville, 497
S.E.2d 82 (N.C. Ct. App. 1998)).
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Like actions arising from contract, actions for injunctive relief have
been found to lie properly outside the Act's scope.9' The plain lan-
guage of the statute supports this conclusion. The first sentence of
section 10/2-101 states that "[n]othing in this Act affects the right to
obtain relief other than damages against a local public entity or public
employee. ' 92 This limitation also helps protect public funds from ex-
haustion through payment for damage remedies, one of the policy rea-
sons behind local governmental immunity.93 Injunctions do not drain
public funds94 but rather can be used to prevent the government or its
employees from committing ongoing injury, thus holding the govern-
ment accountable to its citizens. 95
In PACE, Suburban Bus Division of Regional Transportation Au-
thority v. Regional Transportation Authority, the court confirmed that
the Act does not apply to actions seeking injunctive relief.96 Although
PACE sought to recover unpaid subsidies from RTA along with the
injunction, the court concluded that the subsidies were not damages
and that the Act does not apply absent an action for damages. 97
The Illinois Supreme Court reached a similar conclusion in Raintree
Homes v. Village of Long Grove, which involved a claim for declara-
tory judgment. 98 The court first referred to the text of the statute,
then elicited support from case law. 99 It also discussed in depth the
proper definition of "damages" to determine whether the impact fees
plaintiff sought fell within that category.100 The court ultimately de-
termined that the plaintiff sought restitution, not damages, rendering
the Act inapplicable. 10 1
Finally, in Anderson v. Village of Forest Park, the court noted that
the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution excludes actions under
91. PACE, Suburban Bus Div. of Reg'l Transp. Auth. v. Reg'l Transp. Auth., 803 N.E.2d 13, 29
(Ill. App. Ct. 2003).
92. 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. 10/2-101 (2006).
93. See Bubb v. Springfield Sch. Dist. 186, 657 N.E.2d 887 (111. 1995).
94. See Romano v. Viii. of Glenview, 660 N.E.2d 56, 60 (I11. App. Ct. 1995).
95. See, e.g., Limestone Dev. Corp. v. Vill. of Lemont, 672 N.E.2d 763, 767 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996)
("The purpose of a preliminary injunction is to prevent a threatened wrong or a continuing
injury pending a full hearing on the merits of the case.").
96. 803 N.E.2d at 29.
97. Id. The PACE court cited Romano and Birkett to support the proposition that the Act is
inapplicable to actions other than those for damages. This conclusion ought not be criticized,
because it is supported by Act's plain language, specifically section 10/2-101.
98. 807 N.E.2d 439, 441 (I11. 2004).
99. Id. at 444 (citing In re Consolidated Objections to Tax Levies of School Dist. No. 205, 739
N.E.2d 508, 518 (I11. 2000) (stating that the Act applies to actions for damages and not actions for
injunctive relief)).
100. Id. at 443-47.
101. Id. at 444-46.
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the federal constitution from coverage under the Act. 0 2 Federal con-
stitutional claims, necessarily distinct from claims under the Illinois
state constitution, are controlled by federal law and cannot be limited
or abolished by state law.'0 3 The Supremacy Clause bars any such
result by restricting state laws to covering state matters. 10 4 Claims
under the Illinois state constitution are not similarly constrained. 105
Both Illinois state and federal courts have recognized this
limitation. 106
E. Early Cases Interpreting the Original Definition of Injury
Some cases broadly apply the Tort Immunity Act. For example, the
court in Emulsicoat, Inc. v. City of Hoopeston stated that the Act
"deal[s] with many general potential liabilities."'' 0 7 Also, a concurring
opinion in Tosado v. Miller pointed out that section 8-101 of the Act
"applies to any civil action, not just medical malpractice actions,"
which were at issue in that case. 0 Further, in Anderson, the court
noted that, "[a]lthough the Tort Immunity Act refers to torts in its
title, 'injury' is defined in the Act as including any injury in a civil
action, whether based on Illinois or United States law, including com-
mon law, statutes, and constitutions."10 9
Today's problem exists because other courts have not uniformly
adopted the interpretation of injury found in the above-mentioned
cases. The existence of precedent applying the earlier definition of
injury, which did not include actions under the Illinois state constitu-
tion, contributes to this problem. Several early cases excluded all non-
tort actions from coverage under the Act without further inquiry, a
result that is no longer supported by the text of the Act." t0
102. 606 N.E.2d 205, 212 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992) (noting that "a state immunity defense cannot
control a federal statute").
103. Id.
104. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
105. See ILL. CONST. art. VI, § 9 (1970) (jurisdiction of the courts).
106. See Anderson, 606 N.E.2d at 211-12 (finding the Act inapplicable to a section 1983 claim;
although the statute would seem to cover such claims, a state statute cannot prevent liability for
a federal cause of action); see also Hampton v. City of Chicago, 484 F.2d 602, 607 (7th Cir. 1973)
(holding that, due to the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution, a state law immunity provi-
sion cannot control a federal statute).
107. 425 N.E.2d 1349, 1352 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981). In Emulsicoat, the court found that the Act,
due to its general nature and scope, was properly subjugated by a more specific statute: the
Bond Act. Id.
108. 720 N.E.2d 1075, 1082 (Il1. 1999) (Heiple, J., specially concurring) (emphasis in original).
109. 606 N.E.2d at 212 (citation omitted).
110. See, e.g., Firestone v. Fritz, 456 N.E.2d 904 (Il. App. Ct. 1983); Streeter v. County of
Winnebago, 357 N.E.2d 1371 (Il. App. Ct. 1976).
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In Streeter v. County of Winnebago, the plaintiff brought an action
for damages against Winnebago County for vacating a county road
abutting his property.'1 ' The plaintiff alleged that losing the benefit
of the vacated road denied him access to other main roads and that
the value of his property was reduced." 12 On appeal, the court consid-
ered the applicability of the Act's then-effective notice provision, sec-
tion 10/8-102, which defined injury as section 10/1-204 does
currently.' 13 The plaintiff argued that the instant case was outside
that provision's scope, because the provision applied solely to actions
in tort; plaintiff cited only dicta from a case decided in the Northern
District of Illinois to support this proposition." 4 The court noted that
the Act's notice provisions had been applied to actions other than
common law torts for negligence ' 5 but ended this trend by refusing to
apply the Act's notice provisions to the case at bar. ' 6 Although the
court referred to the Act's text, it ultimately elected to use the title of
the Act, rather than its content, to conclude that the Act did not apply
to the facts of the case.11 7
Seven years later, the court reached a similar conclusion. In Fire-
stone v. Fritz, the plaintiff's property was damaged by overflow flood-
ing caused partly by a retaining wall built on adjoining property. 1 8
The plaintiff brought an action for damages against the owner of the
adjoining land, an individual, and also against the City of Highland,
claiming a denial of equal protection under the constitutions of both
the United States and the state of Illinois. 119 The trial court had dis-
missed plaintiff's claim as time-barred by the Act's notice provision.1 20
The plaintiff argued that the notice provision did not bar his case, be-
cause the provision applied only to torts and not to constitutional
claims.121 The court, noting that plaintiff "allege[d] a violation of con-
stitutional rights by the city and not a tort," next stated that the Act
applied exclusively to tort actions. 122 It cited only two federal district
111. 357 N.E.2d 1371.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 1372-73. The statute of limitations for the Act is now codified. 745 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 10/8-101(c) (2004) ("For purposes of this Article, the term 'civil action' includes any ac-
tion, whether based upon the common law or statutes or Constitution of this State.").
114. Streeter, 357 N.E.2d at 1372-73 (citing Luker v. Nelson, 341 F. Supp. 111 (N.D. Ill. 1972)).
115. Id. at 1373. The cases listed include actions for false arrest, wrongful discharge, malicious
prosecution, and wrongful demolition of a building. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. 456 N.E.2d 904, 906 (IIl. App. Ct. 1983).
119. Id. at 907-08.
120. Id. at 906.
121. Id. at 908.
122. Id.
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court cases for support. 123 With this sweeping statement, the Firestone
court effectively extended Streeter's proclamation by applying the
"tort only" limitation to the entire Act rather than merely the notice
provision. The Firestone court ultimately affirmed the lower court's
dismissal of the complaint, holding that, as to the city, plaintiff failed
to state a cause of action under the equal protection or takings clauses
of either the federal or state constitutions.1 24
F. The Courts' Current Interpretation of the Act's Scope
Following this trend, some Illinois courts continue to limit the Act's
definition of injury, thus subjecting local governmental entities to
more lawsuits. A recent opinion, People ex rel. Birkett v. City of Chi-
cago, demonstrates the limited interpretation some courts have given
to the Act's scope.' 25  Birkett involved a nuisance action against the
City of Chicago for noise caused by O'Hare Airport. 126 In Birkett, the
Roman Catholic Diocese of Joliet, which controlled a school near the
airport that had been affected by the noise, and the State of Illinois
each separately sued the city. 127 The trial court dismissed the actions
based on the city's immunity under the Act.1 28 On appeal, the diocese
argued that the Act, by barring the diocese's claim, denied it "just
compensation" for the governmental taking and damaging of private
property guaranteed under Article I, Section 15 of the Illinois consti-
tution. 129 Therefore, the diocese urged the court to find the Act un-
constitutional, because a statute cannot override a constitutional
right. 130 Alternatively, the diocese argued that the Act's definition of
injury in sections 10/1-204 and 10/2-201 should be struck down as un-
constitutionally vague, because neither section supplied the courts
with any standards for determining which actions-or even which
torts-the Act bars. 131 The Birkett court rejected both arguments.
The court first stated that the diocese "ignore[d] the distinction be-
123. Id. (citing Luker v. Nelson, 341 F. Supp. 111, 117-18 (N.D. II1. 1972); Skrapits v. Skala,
314 F. Supp. 510, 511 (N.D. Ill. 1970)).
124. 456 N.E.2d at 908-09.
125. 758 N.E.2d 25 (I11. App. Ct. 2001). It is not argued that Birkett is not generally analogous
to Streeter and Firestone. All three cases deal with property claims in a situation where the Act's
coverage is unclear. Rather, the argument is that Birkett's reliance on Streeter and Firestone for
the proposition that state constitutional claims are not covered by the Act is improper, because
the Streeter and Firestone decisions predate the Act's amendment.
126. Id. at 26.
127. Id. at 28.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 29.
130. Id. at 29-30.
131. Birkett, 758 N.E.2d at 30.
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tween a violation of a constitutional right and a tort" and that the Act
''applies only to tort actions and does not bar claims for constitutional
violations."'' 32 Next, the court declared that, despite the plain lan-
guage of section 10/1-204, the Act's title indicated that it was meant to
bar only tort actions.' 33 Ultimately, the court held that the trial
court's reliance on the Act was misplaced and that the Act did not bar
the action against the city. 134
III. ANALYSIS
An undesirable discrepancy exists between the definition of injury
in the plain language of the Tort Immunity Act written by the legisla-
ture and the definition of injury as applied by Illinois courts.1 35 Spe-
cifically, Illinois courts have not consistently acknowledged that
actions under the Illinois constitution lie within the scope of the Tort
Immunity Act, despite the statute's provision expressly granting im-
munity for just that type of injury and despite the courts' own re-
peated mandates that a statute's plain language, not its common law
roots, should be used to ascertain the statute's scope. 136 First, this
Part examines the proper scope of the Act by reviewing the statute's
text, which manifests the legislature's intent, 37 and comparing it to
the analyses used and ultimate decisions reached by several courts. 138
Subsequently, this Part discusses a likely reason for the disagreement
between them: courts' failure to consider the Act's definition of in-
jury as revised by a 1986 legislative amendment. 139 It then examines
the effect perpetuated by this incongruity-namely, that the failure to
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Other courts have noted this tendency:
On its face, the Tort Immunity Act appears to include among the covered torts those
arising from both the Illinois and United States Constitutions.... However, Illinois has
narrowly interpreted the Tort Immunity Act to reach only claims arising from torts...
despite the plain reference [in the text of the statute] to injuries arising from the Illinois
Constitution.
Lanna Overseas Shipping, Inc. v. City of Chicago, No. 96-C-3373, 1997 WL 587662, at *20-21
(N.D. Ill. Sept. 18, 1997).
136. E.g., Doe ex rel. Ortega-Piron v. Chi. Bd. of Educ., 820 N.E.2d 418, 421 (Il. 2004) (stating
that, if the court can discern the legislative intent from the plain language of a statute, it should
do so and should not depart from the plain language by reading into it "exceptions, limitations,
or conditions that conflict with the express legislative intent").
137. See, e.g., Harinek v. 161 N. Clark St. Ltd. P'ship, 692 N.E.2d 1177, 1180 (Il. 1998) (stating
that it is proper for Illinois courts to examine the Act's text first, and exclusively if possible, to
ascertain legislative intent, and that it is the duty of the courts to then honor that intent).
138. See infra notes 147-161 and accompanying text.
139. See infra notes 162-178 and accompanying text.
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apply the full statutory definition of an injury covered by the Act cre-
ates confusion and undermines the legislature's intent in adopting
statutory immunity. 140
A. Denying Immunity from State Constitutional Claims Improperly
Limits the Act's Scope
The Birkett court held that claims for violations of the Illinois con-
stitution are not barred by the Act, because they lie outside its
scope.14' This conclusion, and similar conclusions reached by courts
in analogous cases, can be critiqued on several grounds. This Section
discusses four such grounds. First, and most telling, the holding ig-
nores the plain language of the statute, which Birkett and many other
Illinois cases indicated should be central to any statute's interpreta-
tion. 42 Second, when making its decision, the Birkett court relied on
cases decided prior to the statutory amendment that brought constitu-
tional injuries within the Act's scope. 143 Third, the Illinois Supreme
Court has declined to adopt Birkett-type reasoning; instead, it has
stated that the issue-whether the Act's scope is confined to actions in
tort alone-remains open. 144 Fourth, the Birkett court criticized the
Act but suggested no changes that might be made to correct it. 145 De-
parting from the plain language of the statute without pointing to a
constitutional deficiency or indicating how the statute might be cor-
rected by the legislature so as to receive full enforcement is contrary
to the separation of powers doctrine. 146
1. Cases That Improperly Limit the Act's Scope Ignore Both the
Plain Language of the Act and Established Rules of
Statutory Construction
Birkett and similar cases ignore both the Act's text and, accordingly,
the widely accepted rules of statutory construction. It is generally ac-
cepted in Illinois that the plain language of a statute dictates its inter-
pretation.1 47 Illinois courts repeatedly echo the common maxim of
140. See infra notes 179-204 and accompanying text.
141. People ex rel. Birkett v. City of Chicago, 758 N.E.2d 25. 30 (I11. App. Ct. 2001).
142. See infra notes 147-161 and accompanying text.
143. See infra notes 162-178 and accompanying text.
144. See infra notes 179-194 and accompanying text.
145. See infra notes 195-204 and accompanying text.
146. Id.
147. This principle has been explained as follows:
Generally, to construe a statute, a court must ascertain the intent of the legislature and
give it effect. The entire statute must be examined for guidance as to that intent. In
considering the statute, language is given its plain and ordinary meaning. Also, the
statute as a whole must be considered, and each word, clause and section should be
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statutory construction that "examining the statutory language pro-
vides the best means of ascertaining the legislature's intent and that
this language must be given its plain and ordinary meaning."' 148 Dewitt
v. McHenry County, another case interpreting the extent of the Act's
coverage, likewise indicates that "[t]he statutory language is usually
the best indication of the drafters' intent, and the language should be
given its plain, ordinary, and popularly understood meaning. ' 149 The
court made an even stronger statement in Barnett v. Zion Park
District:
[O]ur primary goal is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of
the legislature. We seek the legislative intent primarily from the
language used in the Tort Immunity Act. We evaluate the Act as a
whole; we construe each provision in connection with every other
section. If we can ascertain the legislative intent from the plain lan-
guage of the Act itself, that intent must prevail, and we will give it
effect without resorting to interpretive aids. We must not depart
from the plain language of the Act by reading into it exceptions,
limitations, or conditions that conflict with the express legislative
intent. 150
The Illinois Supreme Court has made it clear that the Act is not
treated differently because of its unique historical development. Bir-
kett itself acknowledges that "[o]ur supreme court has recently held
that courts must look to the Tort Immunity Act and not the common
law to determine whether a governmental immunity exists.' 1 51 Thus,
courts must look to the face of the Act as written to assess the proper
scope of immunity, not to common law tort liability. Regardless, the
Birkett court ignores outright the express language of the Act defining
a covered injury.
attributed some reasonable meaning. It is also a rule of construction that an interpreta-
tion that renders any part of a statute superfluous or produces an absurd result must be
avoided.
Brief of Defendant-Appellant Vill. of Long Grove at *19-20, Raintree Homes v. Vill. of Long
Grove, 2003 WL 23935792 (No. 95181) (11. 2004) (citing In re Incorporation of Vill. of Godfrey,
612 N.E.2d 870, 872 (II1. App. Ct. 1993)).
148. Schutzenhofer v. Granite City Steel Co., 443 N.E.2d 563, 564 (Ill. 1982); accord Fields v.
Chi. Transit Auth., 745 N.E.2d 102, 106-07 (II1. App. Ct. 2001) (stating that it is proper to give
effect to legislative intent when construing a statute, referring specifically to the Metropolitan
Transit Authority Act).
149. 691 N.E.2d 388, 391 (I1. App. Ct. 1998) (citing Collins v. Bd. of Trs. of the Firemen's
Annuity & Benefit Fund, 610 N.E.2d 1250, 1253 (1I1. 1993)).
150. 665 N.E.2d 808, 813 (Il1. 1996) (citations omitted).
151. People ex reL Birkett v. City of Chicago, 758 N.E.2d 25, 29 (I11. App. Ct. 2001) (citing
Vill. of Bloomingdale v. C.D.G. Enters., Inc., 752 N.E.2d 1090, 1096 (Il. 2001)).
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The DiMarco court did the same, refusing to include certain con-
tract claims 52 under the Act, because it was unwilling to infer the
Act's applicability where it was not clearly intended by the legisla-
ture.1 53 This contention was properly before the DiMarco court, be-
cause the parties disputed the nature of contract claims that lie within
the Act's scope. 154 The same rationale cannot be properly asserted,
however, in cases considering the Act's coverage of constitutional
claims. The DiMarco court needed to examine the legislative intent
behind the exclusion of contract claims to ascertain how the immunity
prescribed by the legislature was meant to apply to the facts before
it. 15 5 In contrast, there should be no dispute over the Act's coverage
of constitutional claims, because the legislature has indicated its intent
unequivocally. The legislature has drafted, debated, and passed a
public law amending the statute so as to include constitutional claims
in the statutory definition of injury. 156
Further, courts' refusal to recognize all of the immunities provided
by the text of section 10/1-204 and echoed in other sections, such as
section 10/8-101, also contravenes the legislature's implied intent as
generally interpreted by courts when construing the Act. For exam-
ple, the Illinois Supreme Court has stated that, "[b]y providing immu-
nity, the legislature sought to prevent the diversion of public funds
from their intended purpose to the payment of damage claims.' t 57 In
accordance with this understanding of the legislature's underlying pol-
icy goals, the courts should not restrict the immunity the legislature
intended by excluding state constitutional claims from immunity
coverage.
Another established principle of statutory construction states that a
statute must be interpreted such that "each word, clause or sentence is
given reasonable meaning and not deemed superfluous or void." 158
Courts' assumption that the Act applies only to torts violates this prin-
ciple by rendering section 10/2-101 of the Act meaningless. 159 Section
10/2-101 lists various exceptions to the Act's coverage; specifically, it
preserves municipal liability for actions for relief other than damages,
152. The case referred to the claims as "negligence actions based on a voluntary undertaking
which is evidenced by a contract." DiMarco v. City of Chicago, 662 N.E.2d 525, 529 (I11. App.
Ct. 1996).
153. Id. at 530.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 529-30.
156. 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. 10/1-204 (2006).
157. Bubb v. Springfield Sch. Dist. 186, 657 N.E.2d 887, 891 (Ill. 1995).
158. Raintree Homes v. Vill. of Long Grove, 807 N.E.2d 439, 444 (Il. 2004).
159. See 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. 10/2-101.
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actions sounding in contract, and actions pursuant to various stat-
utes. 160 As was argued in Raintree Homes, an interpretation of the
Act automatically excluding all non-tort actions from coverage ren-
ders section 10/2-101 superfluous; if the Act only applied to torts,
there would be no need to write a section of the statute preserving
liability for contract actions.' 6' This further shows that the legislature
did not intend the Act to exclude actions under the Illinois constitu-
tion from protection merely because they lie outside the category of
traditional tort actions.
2. The Cases Relied upon Should Not Limit the Act's Scope
Because They Predate the Statute's Amendment
Additionally, the reasoning used and holdings reached in appellate
cases like Birkett and Raintree Homes are flawed by courts' reliance
on cases decided before the passage of the relevant amendment ex-
panding the statutory definition of a covered injury. The lack of
strong supporting precedent further casts doubt on these courts' ulti-
mate conclusions. 62 For example, the Birkett court supports its con-
clusion about the Act's coverage by citing only two cases: Streeter v.
County of Winnebago 63 and Firestone v. Fritz.164 Although these au-
thorities do lend some support to the proposition that the Act does
not apply to constitutional claims, both cases were decided years
before the statutory amendment of the relevant definition of an injury
covered by the Act. 165 The Birkett court made no note of these facts.
Further, these cases offer only weak support notwithstanding the
temporal discrepancy involved. Streeter merely held that "if no tort is
involved the provisions of the Tort Immunity Act would not apply."'1 66
In its reasoning, the court focused narrowly on the applicability of a
particular section of the Act: its notice provision.167 The Streeter
court determined that, under the facts of the case, prompt notice was
160. Id.
161. 807 N.E.2d at 443.
162. See, e.g., Kauk v. Matthews, 426 N.E.2d 552, 558 (I11. App. Ct. 1981) (noting that the
absence of precedent supporting plaintiff's claim contributed to its failure).
163. 357 N.E.2d 1371 (I11. App. Ct. 1976).
164. 456 N.E.2d 904 (111. App. Ct. 1983).
165. Section 1-204 of the Act was amended by P.A. 84-1431, art. I, § 2 (effective Nov. 25,
1986) (then codified at 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. 10/1-204 (2006)). Streeter was decided ten years
before the relevant statutory amendment, while Firestone was decided three years before the
amendment.
166. 357 N.E.2d at 1373.
167. Id. at 1372 (discussing 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. 10/8-102 (1973), which was repealed in 1986:
it required that notice be given "within one year of a cause of action accruing against a local
public entity").
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not a "material element" and, therefore, it would be "very technical to
bar to the plaintiffs' action for lack of notice." 168 Also, the notice pro-
vision considered in Streeter was repealed in 1986, further undermin-
ing the support the case offers.1 69
Firestone likewise serves as an unsteady foundation for decisions
like Birkett, and not only because it, like Streeter, was decided prior to
the relevant statutory amendment. In Firestone, the court considered
claims allegedly arising under the equal protection clause of either the
state or federal constitution. 170 The Firestone decision has several
noteworthy aspects. First, the court found that the plaintiffs failed to
state a cause of action in tort, indicating a weak basis for its claim. 71
Second, the court used no binding authority to support its statement
that the Tort Immunity Act applied only to tort actions. 172
Instead, Firestone cited only two cases decided in the Northern Dis-
trict of Illinois. 173 The cases held that the Tort Immunity Act did not
apply to section 1983 claims arising under the federal constitution. 174
The Firestone court essentially considered the likely result if plaintiff
successfully stated claims under the federal constitution, found that
they would be barred, because state law immunity is ineffective
against federal constitutional rights, and extended its decision to
plaintiff's state constitutional claims without offering any apparent
justification for doing so. 17 5 Furthermore, Birkett relies upon this lan-
guage even though it is dictum;176 the Firestone court actually affirmed
168. Id. at 1373. The court also noted that the complaint's plea for "compensation," not just
damages, invoked the Illinois constitution's takings clause; this distinction helped persuade the
court that the claim, due to its lack of any "element of tort," should not be barred by the Act. Id.
169. The provision was repealed by Pub. Act 84-1431, art. I, § 3, effective Nov. 25, 1986 (inci-
dentally, the same public act that amended the Act's definition of a covered injury).
170. 456 N.E.2d 904, 908 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983).
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id. (citing Luker v. Nelson, 341 F. Supp. 111 (N.D. 111. 1972); Skrapits v. Skala, 314 F.
Supp. 510 (N.D. Il1. 1970)).
174. Firestone, 456 N.E.2d at 908 (Ill. App. 1983). In Luker v. Nelson, the court stated, "not
surprisingly, the defendants have cited and our research likewise has yielded no Illinois decision
wherein the state courts have construed § 8-102 to be applicable to a § 1983 suit." 341 F. Supp.
at 116. Similarly, the court in Skrapits v. Skala denied coverage under the Tort Immunity Act,
because the "plaintiff is complaining about an alleged deprivation of his federal constitution
rights." 314 F. Supp. at 511. Again, it should be emphasized that whatever support these cases
might lend to the assertion that the legislature did not intend for the Tort Immunity Act to apply
to causes of action under the state constitution, the legislature's intent at the time of the Act's
initial passage is not determinative in this situation. The legislative intent exhibited by the
amendment of the definition of a covered injury is the real issue here, and both federal cases
were decided prior to that amendment.
175. 456 N.E.2d at 908.
176. 758 N.E.2d 25, 30 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001).
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the lower court's ruling by finding that the plaintiff failed to state a
cause of action under either the federal or Illinois constitution. 177 Fi-
nally, Firestone dealt strictly with the notice provisions of the Act, sec-
tion 10/8-102, rather than the definition in section 10/1-204.178
Therefore, the Firestone court was not actually considering the defini-
tion central to Birkett.
3. The Illinois Supreme Court Has Indicated That the Issue
Remains Open
The reasoning used and conclusions reached about the Act's scope
found in Birkett and similar decisions are flawed in that the Illinois
Supreme Court has not approved of them or made similar findings.
The Illinois Supreme Court has expressly indicated that the issue re-
mains open; it stated in Raintree Homes, Inc. v. Village of Long Grove
that "we do not adopt or approve of the appellate court's reasoning
that the Tort Immunity Act categorically excludes actions that do not
sound in tort."'1 79 The Illinois Supreme Court's statement in Raintree
Homes responded to the appellate court's contrary assertion in its dis-
position of the case. The appellate court relied on two grounds for its
finding that the Act barred torts exclusively: the Act's title and its
historical context.' 80 Neither assessment provides a solid foundation
for that finding. The appellate court's decision to rely on the title of
the Act for its claim that the legislature intended the Act to bar only
tort claims ignores the more complete and obvious manifestation of
legislative intent found in the 1986 amendment to the Act's definition
of injury.' 8 1 While a statute's title is a helpful tool in determining the
legislature's goals when enacting it, the title cannot serve as the sole
basis for a decision regarding the statute's scope, especially if it is con-
tradicted by the plain language of the statute. 82
177. 456 N.E.2d at 908.
178. Id.; see also Luker, 341 F. Supp. at 117; Skrapits, 314 F. Supp. at 511.
179. 807 N.E.2d 439, 447 (I11. 2004).
180. 780 N.E. 2d 773, 775-76 (I11. App. Ct. 2002).
181. See 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. 10/1-204 (2006).
182. The court similarly considered the Tort Immunity Act's title in Dewitt v. McHenry
County. 691 N.E.2d 388, 391 (I11. App. Ct. 1998) (noting that a statute's title may assist in, but
not be entirely determinative of, its proper interpretation). In finding that the Act does not bar
claims sounding in contract, the Dewitt court took into account the Act's title. Id. However, its
decision was supported not only by the Act's title, but also by its text, which plainly excludes
contract claims. Id. In contrast, the ultimate conclusion in Birkett v. City of Chicago is sharply
contradicted by the Statute's actual text. 758 N.E.2d 25, 32-33 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001). Thus, it may
be helpful for a court to consider a statute's title as a factor in determining its scope, but not as
the exclusive factor. It is overly simplistic to assume that the title of a statute captures all of the
intricacies contained in its text.
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Second, the Raintree Homes appellate decision cites to the Act's
historical context to support its claims as to the Act's limited applica-
bility. 183 Relying only upon the Act's historical context for interpreta-
tion ignores both the Act's plain language and the Illinois Supreme
Court's recent proclamation that legislative intent, not reference to
the common law, should determine local governmental immunity.
184
The appellate court's assertion that the legislature did not intend the
Act to apply to any non-tort action because no such intent appears in
the Act's legislative history is meritless in light of the legislature's ac-
tual amendment of the Act.
The Illinois Supreme Court correctly refused to adopt this flawed
approach. In fact, the court indicated in Raintree Homes that the Act
may properly apply to non-tort actions by stating that "the Village [of
Long Grove, the defendant in Raintree Homes] correctly asserts that
Village of Bloomingdale [v. C.D.G. Enterprises, Inc.] may have implic-
itly found that the [Tort Immunity] Act applied to some nontort ac-
tions specifically at issue in that case, [but] such a holding does not
imply that the Act applies to all non-tort actions against a
government." 8 5
The court's discussion of the "implicit holding" of Village of Bloom-
ingdale refers to a case decided by the Illinois Supreme Court three
years before Raintree Homes.186 In one of the claims raised in Village
of Bloomingdale, a real estate developer attempted to recover dam-
ages from the Village for interference with business expectancy. 187
The Illinois Supreme Court first examined the developer's counter-
claim in tort, which rested on the developer's assertion that the Act
did not shield governmental actions undertaken for "corrupt or mali-
cious motives."188 The Illinois Supreme Court cited a long line of
cases in which it repeatedly refused to read exceptions into the Act
where they were not clearly intended by the legislature18 9 and accord-
183. 780 N.E.2d at 775-76.
184. See Viii. of Bloomingdale v. C.D.G. Enters., Inc., 752 N.E.2d 1090, 1095 (111. 2001) ("To-
day, therefore, the tort liability of a local public entity or employee is expressly controlled both
by the constitutional provision [ILL. CONST. art XIII, § 4] and by legislative prerogative as em-
bodied in the Tort Immunity Act," not the common law doctrine of sovereign immunity.).
185. Raintree Homes, 807 N.E.2d at 445-46 (emphasis in original).
186. Id. (citing Viii. of Bloomingdale, 752 N.E.2d at 1101-02).
187. 752 N.E.2d at 1094.
188. Id. at 1095.
189. Id. at 1096-98. First, Barnett v. Zion Park Dist., in which the court dismissed a claim
against the park district arising from a drowning in its swimming pool, the court found the dis-
trict immune from liability under section 10/3-108 of the Act, which provides that "neither a
local public entity nor a public employee is liable for an injury for failure to supervise an activity
on or the use of any public property." 665 N.E.2d 808 (I11. 1996) (citing 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. 10/
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ingly refused to do so in the case at bar.' 90 Next, the court considered
the developer's second counterclaim, which was based on a quasi-con-
tract theory. The developer framed its second counterclaim in such a
way as to "avail itself of section 2-101 of the [Tort Immunity] Act,
which states that the Act does not affect liability based on con-
tract."191 The court considered the theory and determined that the
quasi-contract claim was not based in contract, I ut rather on a theory
of unjust enrichment; therefore, the claim was barred by the Tort Im-
munity Act and had been properly dismissed by the trial court and
improperly reversed by the appellate court. 192
The key aspect of the Illinois Supreme Court's decision is that it
even considered the developer's non-tort claim. The court did not ask
simply whether the claim was based in tort, as it might have if it as-
sumed that only actions in tort are affected by the Act. 193 Rather, it
considered the nature of the counterclaim in quasi-contract to deter-
mine whether or not the Act applied. One can assume that this key
mode of analysis is what the Illinois Supreme Court alluded to in
Raintree Homes as the "implied holding" in Bloomingdale. Certainly,
it lent important support to the Raintree Homes court's refusal to find
that the Act "categorically excludes actions that do not sound in
tort. "194
3-108(b)). The court refused to find an exception limiting immunity, because the legislature had
not unambiguously done so. Id. at 814. Second, in In re Chicago Flood Litigation, the court held
that the City of Chicago was immune from suit alleging its failure to supervise a construction
contractor, even though the bridge workers' efforts caused flooding and water damage to some
homes. 680 N.E.2d 265, 268. 273 (11. 1997). Again, the court dismissed the complaint, because it
was not willing to limit immunity beyond the clearly intended bounds established by the legisla-
ture. Id. at 273. Third, in Harinek v. 161 North Clark Street Partnership, the court found that the
fire marshal's acts, though allegedly negligent, were properly characterized as "acts or omissions
in determining policy and exercising discretion [under section 2-201]." 692 N.E.2d 1177, 1182
(Ill. 1998). Again, acting according to the interpretation of the Act most faithful to the words
written by the legislature, the court ruled the claim to be barred by the city's immunity. Id. at
1183-84. Finally, in Henrich v. Libertyville High School, the court again abided by the plain
language of section 10/3-108 in upholding the school's immunity. 712 N.E.2d 298, 305-06 (Ill.
1998).
190. Vill. of Bloomingdale v. C.D.G. Enters., Inc., 752 N.E.2d 1090. 1095-99 (I11. 2001).
191. Id. at 1101.
192. Id. at 1101-02.
193. This was effectively the rationale employed by the dissent in the appellate court decision.
Vill. of Bloomingdale v. C.D.G. Enters., Inc., 732 N.E.2d 633,642 (I11. App. Ct. 2000) (Bowman,
J., dissenting), rev'd, 752 N.E.2d 1090 (Ill. 2001).
194. 807 N.E.2d 439, 447 (Ill. 2004).
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4. It Is Improper for Courts to Depart from the Legislature's Intent
without Sufficient Justification
Finally, the courts lack persuasiveness when they selectively enforce
the Act without suggesting express changes that the legislature might
make to ensure enforcement of the Act's full text. Rather than di-
rectly addressing the issue by overruling the statute in part and invali-
dating some of its content, the courts have simply criticized the Act
and refused to implement it as written. 95 This treatment not only
contravenes the legislature's proclamations but likewise contravenes
rules established by higher courts.
For example, the Illinois Supreme Court has refused to negate stat-
utory immunity by applying exceptions from another source. In
Harinek v. 161 North Clark Street Ltd. Partnership, the court relied
upon the Act's plain text to reach its conclusions about municipal im-
munity for exercises of discretion and policy determinations.1 96 Ulti-
mately, it held that it would "not depart from the plain language of
the Act by reading into it exceptions, limitations, or conditions that
conflict with the express legislative intent."' 97 Many Illinois courts
likewise have continued to refine the proper interpretation of the stat-
ute's intricacies, such as by further clarifying the distinction between
policy decisions and discretionary acts 98 and by resolving the influ-
ence of other statutes with converging coverage. 199 Nevertheless, they
have not, and should not, depart from their duty to honor legislative
intent.
As previously described, local governmental immunity in Illinois no
longer exists under the common law. Its common law basis was over-
turned and replaced by two legislative acts: revisions to the Illinois
constitution and the enactment of the Tort Immunity Act.2 00 Thus,
the issue has been taken out of courts' hands and placed in those of
the legislators. Courts should recognize their proper role as enforcers
of legislative enactments, not rewriters of the same. As the Illinois
Supreme Court indicated in Harinek, judges should show particular
195. See generally ILL. CONST. art. 2, § 1 (1970) (separation of powers clause).
196. 692 N.E.2d 1177, 1180 (Il. 1998).
197. Id.
198. Van Meter v. Darien Park Dist.. 799 N.E.2d 273, 279 (Ill. 2003) (noting the importance of
strictly construing the Tort Immunity Act).
199. Moore v. Green, 848 N.E.2d 1015. 1020 (Il1. 2006) (holding partial immunity under the
Domestic Violence Act of 1986 proper in the instant case rather than absolute immunity under
the Tort Immunity Act: the court quoted the relevant sections of the Tort Immunity Act and
noted that the text should be honored "[in a typical case").
200. See ILL. CONST. art. 8, § 4 (1970); Harinek. 692 N.E.2d at 1182 ("The ratification of the
Illinois Constitution of 1970 validated both Molitor and the Tort Immunity Act.").
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deference to the legislature regarding local governmental tort immu-
nity, because the Illinois constitution mandates such deference. 20'
The court explained as follows:
[W]hen a court finds ... that the General Assembly has granted a
public entity immunity from liability, the court may not then negate
that statutory immunity by applying a common law exception to a
common law rule. Doing so would violate not only the Illinois Con-
stitution's provision governing sovereign immunity, but also the
Constitution's separation of powers clause, which provides that no
branch of government "shall exercise powers properly belonging to
another. "202
To further emphasize the error courts commit when usurping the leg-
islature's powers, the court also quoted People v. Garner, in which it
stated, "Under the doctrine of separation of powers, courts may not
legislate, rewrite or extend legislation. If the statute as enacted seems
to operate in certain cases unjustly or inappropriately, the appeal must
be to the General Assembly, and not to the court. '20 3 Despite the
absolute clarity of these mandates from the Illinois Supreme Court
and the Illinois constitution, appellate courts have done precisely the
opposite by refusing to uphold municipal immunity from actions
under the state constitution.
The need for clear communication between the courts and the legis-
lature is especially significant in this context. Just as the legislature
responded to Molitor by passing the Tort Immunity Act, the legisla-
ture responded to other case law-such as Streeter and Firestone-by
amending the definition of a covered injury to include actions for
which the courts were denying coverage. If the enactment somehow
was improper, the legislature must be given a chance to further amend
or otherwise alter the statute to accomplish its intended goals; the
courts deny the legislature this opportunity if they simply refuse to
recognize the full statutory definition without giving a convincing rea-
son for their actions, indicating why the statute as written is unen-
forceable or suggesting how it might be corrected.2 0 4
201. Harinek, 692 N.E.2d at 1180 ("In construing the [Tort Immunity] Act, our primary goal is
to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the legislature.").
202. Id. at 1183 (citations omitted).
203. Michigan Ave. Nat'l Bank v. County of Cook, 732 N.E.2d 528, 544 (Ill. 2000) (quoting
People v. Garner, 590 N.E.2d 470, 476 (111. 1992)).
204. See Mark C. Miller, Conflicts between the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court and the
Legislature: Campaign Finance Reform and Same-Sex Marriage, 4 PIERCE L. REV. 279, 315-16
(2005-2006) (addressing the importance of inter-institutional dialogue between the courts and
the legislature and specifically suggesting that each needs "greater communication with and re-
spect for the other body" in order to best serve its goals and the legal system). See also Hon.
Daniel E. Wathen, When the Court Speaks: Effective Communication As a Part of Judging, 57
ME. L. REV. 449 (2005) (providing an interesting discussion of a judge's duty not only to decide
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IV. IMPACT
The Illinois Supreme Court should make a definitive ruling resolv-
ing this discrepancy in tort immunity law. A number of options are
available. Looking to other states helps assess the full range of pos-
sibilities. First, and most preferably, the Illinois Supreme Court could
recognize the full statutory definition of a covered injury as it exists in
the text of the Act.20 5 Alternatively, Illinois courts might reject the
injury definition or part of it for some valid reason, thus giving the
legislature the information necessary to amend the definition to the
courts' satisfaction. 20 6
This Note argues that the courts' best option is to recognize the full
coverage of the Tort Immunity Act as written. 20 7 There are several
reasons why this option is preferable: it honors the maxims commonly
used to construe statutes;20 8 it serves the policy rationales underlying
the Act;209 and it gives control to the legislature, which is better
equipped to examine all relevant facts and determine the statute's
scope.210 Courts regularly state that legislative intent should guide
statutory construction; here, legislative intent unquestionably supports
the plain language of the Act. 21 Ultimately, the legislature's role is to
draft laws that serve the public it represents, and it is the courts' role
to interpret and enforce those laws as they have been written.
Second, the same rationales underlying the Act as a whole also sup-
port extending the Act's enforced scope to include actions under the
Illinois constitution. 21 2 To begin with, expanding the scope of immu-
nity granted by the Act further protects municipal funds.213 Offering
immunity to local governmental entities recognizes the special nature
of those entities as bodies existing primarily for the public good, not to
create profit.214 The Act itself was created in part to protect these
cases but also to convey those decisions to others, including the parties, their counsel, and the
media).
205. See infra notes 211-226 and accompanying text.
206. See infra notes 230-233 and accompanying text.
207. See infra notes 214-232 and accompanying text.
208. See infra notes 211, 218. and 219 and accompanying text.
209. See infra notes 214-219 and accompanying text.
210. See infra notes 220-223 and accompanying text.
211. See, e.g., Schutzenhofer v. Granite City Steel Co., 443 N.E.2d 563, 564 (Ill. 1982) ("This
court has consistently held that examining the statutory language provides the best means of
ascertaining the legislature's intent and that this language must be given its plain and ordinary
meaning."); see also Fields v. Chi. Transit Auth., 745 N.E.2d 102, 106-07 (I11. App. Ct. 2001)
(stating that it is proper to give effect to legislative intent when construing a statute).
212. See supra notes 34-50 and accompanying text.
213. See infra notes 214-218 and accompanying text.
214. 56 AM. JUR. 2D Mun. Corps. § 178 (2000); 1 MCQUILLIN Man. Corps. § 2.08 (3d ed.
1999).
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entities and prevent them from burdening residents with additional
costs. 215 If courts recognize immunity from damages for Illinois con-
stitutional injuries, units of local government will be afforded the full
protection that the legislature envisioned when it created the Act.
The costs of litigation and judgments relating to claims under the Illi-
nois constitution would be avoided instead of being passed to taxpay-
ers. Similarly, the courts' time would be conserved, another
efficiency. Further, offering protection against lawsuits encourages
public employees to perform their duties to the fullest extent possible,
without hindrance or hesitance caused by the fear of legal liability.21 6
Also, there is no reason to suspect that barring constitutional claims
will overreach any more than barring tort claims might. All claims
that fall within the Act's definition of a covered injury remain subject
to the Act's other requirements and limitations, such as the distinction
between discretionary acts and proprietary acts217 and the distinction
between claims alleging negligence, which the Act bars, and claims
alleging willful and wanton conduct, which the Act does not bar.218
These and other built-in safeguards control the Act's scope.
Further, there is no basis for treating tort injuries and constitutional
injuries differently, because courts have not distinguished between
them. Courts have not, for example, contrasted the importance and
role of constitutional rights with tort claims, which might be consid-
ered less significant. Such a distinction, if offered, could explain
courts' reasoning and create a basis for departure from the statute.219
However, no rationale has in fact been offered, so it remains best for
courts to enforce the Act's plain language.
Finally, the legislature is better equipped to examine all of the facts
and make policy decisions about immunity.220 Courts' investigative
abilities are more restricted, because their inquiries are limited to the
215. See, e.g., Kevin's Towing, Inc. v. Thomas, 814 N.E.2d 1003, 1007 (11. App. Ct. 2004)
(citing Van Meter v. Darien Park Dist., 799 N.E.2d 273 (I1. 2003)).
216. Valentino v. Hilquist, 785 N.E.2d 891, 899 (Il. App. Ct. 2003) ("The possibility of incur-
ring multimillion dollar liability could chill [the civil servants'] willingness [to carry out their
duties] and deter them from providing such a service.").
217. 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. 10/2-201 (2006) (providing immunity for the acts of government
entities and employees involving the determination of policy or exercise of discretion).
218. See, e.g., 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. 10/3-108; 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. 10/5-106. Both of these
provisions include exceptions from immunity coverage for willful and wanton conduct; many
sections of the Act include the same.
219. See supra note 218.
220. See, e.g., Anderson v. Vanderslice, 126 So. 2d 522, 523 (Miss. 1961) ("If any change is to
be made it should be brought about by legislation so that all aspects of the problem could receive
consideration."): Fette v. City of St. Louis, 366 S.W.2d 446, 447 (Mo. 1963) ("We think ... this is
properly a matter for the legislature.").
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facts of each case before them.221 In contrast, the legislature can
choose what it investigates222 and has broader power to conduct inde-
pendent inquiries and examine issues in depth.223 Additionally, the
legislature is directly accountable to the public that elects it and is
subject to more direct control by citizens, making it a better servant of
the public than, for example, appointed judges.
Municipalities and other local bodies are important, because they
form the basis for local government. Statutes such as the Tort Immu-
nity Act prevent the dissipation of these entities' funds that might oth-
erwise be used to serve citizens directly and foster community, such as
by establishing and offering police and fire services, 224 repairing side-
walks,225 and maintaining parks. 226 Few would argue that the safety,
self-governance, and recreation of all members of a community should
be subordinate to a few isolated individuals' ability to seek tort
damages.227
Without question, extending immunity creates some tension in the
law. Granting broader immunity to units of local government and
their employees means that some plaintiffs who would have a success-
ful cause of action against an individual may be left without a remedy
if the harm was inflicted by a public body or employee who qualifies
for statutory immunity. 228 Nonetheless, all law is the product of a se-
221. See, e.g., Holzrichter v. County of Cook, 595 N.E.2d 1237, 1241 (I11. App. Ct. 1992) (stat-
ing that a court is limited by the specific set of facts presented in the case before it).
222. 33A ILL. LAW & PRACTICE State Government § 21 (2005) (stating that legislative bodies
have the authority to conduct investigations to acquire the information needed to legislate
knowledgeably and effectively (citing Du Bois v. Gibbons, 118 N.E.2d 295 (11. 1954); Greenfield
v. Russel, 127 N.E. 102 (Ill. 1920); Murphy v. Collins. 312 N.E.2d 772. 785 (I1. App. Ct. 1974))).
223. Id.
224. 1 MCQUILLIN Mon. Corp. § 2.08 (3d ed. 1999); see also DeSmet ex rel. Estate of Hays v.
County of Rock Island, 848 N.E.2d 1030, 1045 (I11. 2006) (granting immunity under the Act
against allegations of failure to provide adequate police service); Randich v. Pirtano Const. Co.,
804 N.E.2d 581. 591 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003) (holding in part that firemen are immune under the Act
from liability for their own negligent acts).
225. 7A MCQUILLIN Mun. Corp. § 24.570; see also Burlingame v. Chi. Park Dist., 689 N.E.2d
234, 237 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997) (affirming the Park District's immunity under the Act against allega-
tions of failure to repair a cracked sidewalk).
226. 1 MCQUILLIN Mun. Corp. § 2.30.10; see also Helms v. Chi. Park Dist., 630 N.E.2d 1016,
1021 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994) (affirming the Park District's immunity under the Act against negli-
gence claims for failure to warn about the danger posed by exercise equipment).
227. See Muskopf v. Corning Hosp. Dist., 359 P.2d 457, 459 (Cal. 1961); Hargrove v. Town of
Cocoa Beach, 96 So. 2d 130 (Fla. 1957) (en banc).
228. For an interesting discussion of this idea in the context of the conflict between state
immunity doctrines and the taking clause, see Eric Berger, The Collision of the Takings and State
Sovereign Immunity Doctrines, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 493 (2006). The article discusses how a
remedy's availability is affected by the opposing principles of protection of the law against in-
jury, as voiced by Chief Justice Marshall in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163
(1803) ("The very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every individual to
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ries of decisions; many times, a course of action is followed because it
works toward the good of a larger group of people, although at some
cost to others. Historical authority created municipal immunity and,
after its temporary abolition by the judiciary, modern legislators reen-
acted it. The democratically elected legislature makes these policy de-
cisions. Aggrieved individuals left without remedy are free to lobby
the legislature for change if they see fit.
Changes to the Act ought to come from the legislature, perhaps at
the invitation or urging of the courts or citizens.229 The legislature has
several options should it choose to scale back the Act's coverage. For
example, it might provide that only limited damages can be awarded
for constitutional claims against local governmental entities, 230 or it
could require a separate implementing statute in order for constitu-
tional claims to be brought against municipalities. 23' Interaction be-
tween the courts and the legislature is key. Because these two
governmental branches are to act as checks on one another, more ex-
tensive interaction between them might further the public good. 232 In
this context, interaction between the branches could clarify the law
through amendment or explanation of the statute. The current option
of non-enforcement neither honors the legislature's intent nor legiti-
mizes the courts' role as statutory interpreters. Illinois courts are on
the verge of taking the final step toward resolving the inconsistency
surrounding the Act; doing so will be a welcome change.
V. CONCLUSION
Many other states have overturned sovereign immunity without en-
countering the problems Illinois now faces. Illinois law currently con-
tains a discrepancy between the local governmental immunity
apparently authorized by the Tort Immunity Act and that recognized
by case law. The problem arose from a failure to recognize the statu-
claim the protection of the laws, whenever he receives an injury."), and other external limits
placed on recovery, including sovereign immunity, jurisdiction, and democratic ideas, such as the
proper placement of the right to control public funds. Berger, supra, at 528-29.
229. See supra notes 220-223 and accompanying text.
230. For example, in Montana. the state is not immune from lawsuits, but the recoverable
damages are limited. 18 MCQUILLIN Mun. Corps. § 53.02.10 n.2 (citing Mackin v. State, 621 P.2d
477 (Mont. 1980)).
231. See T. Hunter Jefferson, Constitutional Wrongs and Common Law Principles: The Case
for the Recognition of State Constitutional Tort Actions against State Governments, 50 VAND. L.
REV. 1525, 1547 (1997).
232. For example, extensive interaction has taken place between the legislature and judiciary
in Iowa. This includes several situations in which the courts have responded to legislative action
by reading exceptions into the Iowa Tort Claims Act. Jason E. McCollough, State Tort Liability
for Failure to Protect Against Bioterrorism. 8 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 743, 751-65 (2003).
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tory amendment to the definition of injury, which defines the types of
cases from which local governmental entities are immune. Legal
scholarship is built on reference to precedent, but, occasionally, reli-
ance on precedent is misleading, such as when changes have been en-
acted since that precedent was established. In 1986, the Illinois
legislature amended the definition of a covered injury to include ac-
tions under the Constitution of the State of Illinois. However, case
law sometimes restricts the Tort Immunity Act to supplying local gov-
ernmental immunity against torts alone. The role of the courts in this
context is straightforward: "Simply put, it is not within the purview of
[a] court to rewrite portions of the Tort Immunity Act. '233
The state of this area of Illinois law, although currently imperfect, is
promising. Municipal law is not as fast-moving as some other areas of
law, and, judging from the number of reported decisions, cases are not
often brought against local governmental bodies for causes of action
arising under the Illinois constitution. Nonetheless, Illinois is on the
verge of repairing the glitch in its interpretation of the Tort Immunity
Act. The Illinois Supreme Court has already indicated that the scope
of the Tort Immunity Act is not necessarily restricted to torts alone.
Illinois is poised to uniformly apply the Tort Immunity Act's provi-
sions as written, perhaps beginning as soon as the next proper case
arises.
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